Riyadh Agreement 2014

„They have not used any of the conflict resolution mechanisms,“ Qatar`s foreign minister said in the agreements. „If there are complaints, they should be discussed either under the Riyadh agreement or in accordance with the GCC Charter.“ None of this has happened. Meanwhile, Bishara and his leftist nationalist agenda have received more money and attention, and Qaradawi and other leading Islamists remain the main backers of Al Jazeera and other Qatari-backed media. Some Hamas operatives were recently encouraged to leave Doha, but the organization presented its „new charter“ at a ceremony in Qatar`s capital, which still serves as Hamas` de facto headquarters outside Gaza. Whatever their GCC partners believe Doha has accepted, the Qataris either gave a completely different idea of the importance and impact of the 2014 agreement, or they did not intend to honour them to the satisfaction of their allies. Finally, on 16 November 2014, the six GCC heads of state signed the third Riyadh agreement (also known as the Riyadh Complementary Agreement). The third agreement confirmed the material provisions of the first two agreements and added two other important principles. First, it „emphasizes that the non-commitment of one of the articles of the Riyadh Agreement and its executive mechanism constitutes a violation of all of them.“ Secondly, the lack of dispute resolution mechanisms between Member States in the event of a relative disagreement could also have a negative impact on the GCC and hinder its development and growth. In addition, no institutional activities or structures have yet been put in place to respond to the implementation of the resolutions adopted at the GCC summits. Similarly, apart from the whims of its leaders, no court, structure or policy governs the activities of the GCC in any way. In addition, there is no common system, laws, regulations, institutions, policies or mechanisms that ensure that GCC citizens have a say and that their voices are heard. Qatar`s support for the uprisings has been met head-on with the policies and efforts of other GCC countries. Thus, the Riyadh meeting and the first agreement were an attempt by the GCC countries to prevent Qatar from pursuing its policy towards the Arab Spring.

When Qatar continued to support popular movements and uprisings, the withdrawal of ambassadors was a kind of vote of political no confidence and called on Doha to stop acting in a way that is in the interests of other GCC countries. Al Arabiya News Channel received and published the Vonariyadh Agreements of 2013 and 2014 signed by Qatari Emir Sheikh Tamim bin Hamad al-Thani in 2013 and 2014, which promised to meet several demands that were formulated at the time. Both sides of the Gulf trench have accused each other of violating the Riyadh agreements. One of the clauses of the additional Riyadh agreement signed by Qatar in 2014 was the termination of all direct or indirect jobs in Doha and support for media professionals and media professionals who have an anti-GCC agenda. The agreement provides that in the event of non-compliance by one state, „other states have the right to take what they deem appropriate to protect their security and stability.“ It can be said that with the resolution of the GCC crisis and the return of ambassadors to Doha, Qatar has reached a new level of political maturity. It managed to end the crisis without changing its foreign policy principles or abandoning its allies.