Arbitration Agreement And Waiver Of Jury Trial
On the other hand, an arbitration provision, dealt with by another court, explicitly identified claims based on statutes, regulations and anti-discrimination laws. The corresponding clause, referred to in a third decision, which is effectively named, is abandoned to anti-discrimination legislation. In both decisions, the Court found that the language at issue clearly intended to waive legal remedies. Arbitration – You or Earny may initiate arbitration proceedings in Los Angeles County, California or the Federal Court District that contains your billing address. In the event that you select the Federal Court District that contains your billing address, Earny may transfer the arbitration to Los Angeles County, California, if earny agrees to pay additional fees or fees that you will incur as a result of the transfer, as determined by the arbitrator. It remains unclear whether a Texas court would impose a waiver clause on the jury in a trust where the beneficiary/plaintiff would not sign the trust document. There are many questions that concern such a question: 1) whether such a clause can be applied to a non-signature; 2) if such a clause, as is the case in the context of arbitration, can benefit directly; 3) which party is charged with proving that a discrete clause was knowingly and voluntarily entered into; and 4) what evidence must be provided to prove a voluntary and knowingly waiver. In principle, arbitration, forum selection and jury waiver clauses should all be assessed to the same standard. They all deprive a party of constitutional rights – but as the courts recognize, a party can relinquish those rights. They should all be assessed either according to the standard of contract/mutual consent of arbitration agreements or to a higher „knowledge and voluntary“ standard.
There is no logical difference between them. According to the author, the courts are too willing to impose arbitration, forum selection and jury clauses. The right to a jury is „one of our most precious rights“ and holds „a sacred place“ in our history. General Motors Corp. Gayle, 951 S.W.2d 469, 476 (Tex. 1997) (orig. proceeding). The restrictions of this right will therefore be subject to „extreme review.“ Bell Helicopter Textron, Inc. Abbott, 863 S.W.2d 139, 141 (Tex).
App.-Texarkana 1993, writ denied); Jones v. Jones, 592 S.W.2d 19 (Tex. Civ. App. -Beaumont 1979, no writ); Rayson v. Johns, 524 S.W.2d 380 (Tex. Civ. App.-Texarkana 1975, writ ref`d n.r.); Silver v. Shefman, 287 S.W.2d 316 (Tex. Civ. App.-Austin 1956, writ ref`d n.r.e.). Out of respect, the Texas Supreme Court did not do a very good job of demanding „supreme control“ by allowing an accused to deny a plaintiff a day in court (a Texas court).
The words „knowing and voluntary“ should mean something and should apply to arbitration procedures, forum selection, and jury conciliation clauses.
